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Preserved re-experience of discrete emotions: amnesia and executive function 
Abstract 
Amnesic patients can re-experience emotions elicited by forgotten events, suggesting that brain 
systems for episodic and emotional memory are independent. However, the range of such 
emotional memories remains under-investigated (most studies employing just positive-negative 
emotion dyads), and executive function may also play a role in the re-experience of emotions. 
This is the first investigation of the intensity of the emotional re-experience of a range of 
discrete emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) for a group of amnesic patients. 
Twenty Korsakoff syndrome (KS) patients and 20 neurologically normal controls listened to 
four novel emotional vignettes selectively eliciting the four basic emotions. Emotional 
experience was measured using pen-and-paper Visual Analogue Mood Scales and episodic 
memory using verbal recollections. After 30 minutes, the recollection of stories was severely 
impaired for the patient group, but the emotional re-experience was no different from that of 
controls. Notably, there was no relationship between episodic recall and the intensity of the 
four emotions, such that even profoundly amnesic patients reported moderate levels of the 
target emotion. Exploratory analyses revealed negative correlations between the intensity of 
basic emotions and executive functions (e.g., cognitive flexibility and response inhibition) for 
controls but not patients. The results suggest that discrete emotions can be re-experienced 
independently of episodic memory, and that the re-experience of certain discrete emotions 
appears to be dampened by executive control. KS patients with absent or mild cognitive 
symptoms should benefit from emotion-regulation interventions aimed at reducing the 
recognised affective burden associated with their episodic memory deficit. 
Keywords: emotional memory; episodic memory; amnesia; Korsakoff syndrome; executive 
function; discrete emotions  
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 Past emotions have long been shown to be encoded and accurately retrieved in the 
absence of an episodic memory trace of the eliciting event. The famous early report of Swiss 
neurologist Édouard Claparède describes an amnesic Korsakoff’s syndrome patient avoiding 
his handshake after being pricked with a hidden pin (Claparède, 1911/1951). More recent 
studies have found that even densely amnesic patients show an improved recognition of 
emotional stimuli, of roughly the same magnitude as controls (Hamann, Cahill, McGaugh, & 
Squire, 1997), and possess the same ability to access past emotional experiences and to employ 
them in guiding present decisions (Turnbull & Evans, 2006). The dissociation between the 
roles of the amygdala and hippocampus (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland, & 
Damasio, 1995; see also Phelps, 2004), have offered insight into the neural mechanisms behind 
the preserved ability of amnesic patients to accurately re-experience past emotions. We use the 
term “emotional re-experience” as a generic reference to instances of emotional conditioning 
(e.g., Bechara et al., 1995). This can happen when an emotion is first experienced following an 
emotional event and then re-experienced when the event is merely cued or prompted, but in the 
absence of any actual emotional stimuli or their explicit recollection. Notably, this emotional 
conditioning (re-experience) can take place following both direct affective experiences, such 
as, after a loud noise, or an emotional image/clip (Bechara et al., 1995) or as a result of an 
instructed episodic representation of an event of emotional significance (Phelps, 2004). 
 A large body of psychological evidence has proposed that cognition can influence and 
be influenced by emotions (Bower, 1992). Emotion–cognition interactions are largely agreed to 
be a major factor influencing the processes that sustain, amplify, or attenuate emotion 
experience – collectively labelled emotion regulation (Izard, Woodburn, Finlon, Krauthamer-
Ewing, Grossman, & Seidenfeld, 2011). Moreover, emotion–cognition interactions are also 
viewed as a fundamental part of our ability to engage attentional, emotional-cognitive, and 
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behavioural capacities in order to solve everyday challenges – generically referred to as 
executive function (cf., Nelson, Thomas, & deHaan, 2006).  
 Executive functions play a role in moderating emotional responses and behavioural 
actions (Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2012). Executive control is often 
reported to influence the processing and experience of emotions in both the absence of emotion 
disorders (Cohen, Henik, & Moyal, 2012), as well as in a range of psychiatric patients (Etkin, 
Prater, Hoeft, Menon, & Schatzberg, 2010). Furthermore, neuroimaging evidence showed that 
emotion regulation and re-experience are strictly linked with brain regions involved in 
executive function (Cohen, Henik, & Mor, 2011; Kim & Hamman, 2007). Significantly, 
impaired executive functioning (executive dysfunction) is often associated with maladaptive 
emotional responses and social behaviour (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
1999; Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio, & Damasio, 1992). Thus, executive function and episodic 
recall are closely linked with emotional re-experience, but the influences they exert on specific 
forms of affect remain unclear. This is unsurprising given that the definition and classification 
of emotions is the subject of a long-lasting and ongoing debate in the literature (Russell & 
Feldman Barrett, 1999). 
  Not all emotional experiences are the same, and negative emotions have been 
suggested to possess a special property of being more stable than happiness, in the absence of 
episodic memory. For example, sadness was reported to be more enduring for amnesic patients 
than controls, while happiness might not be any different (Feinstein, Duff, & Tranel, 2010). 
Such a dissociation would not be surprising, since positive and negative emotions appear to be 
affected by different classes of bias (Levine, Lench, & Safer, 2009) and by different emotion 
regulation processes (Kim & Hamann, 2007). However, a growing body of evidence argues 
that not only generic positive and negative emotions, but discrete basic emotions (e.g., anger, 
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fear, sadness, happiness) may differ in the way they are re-experienced. Discrete emotions 
have been shown to uniquely activate different neural structures (Tettamanti, Rognoni, Cafiero, 
Costa, Galati, & Perani, 2012; Vytal & Hamann, 2010), have been linked with individual 
autonomic nervous system response patterns (Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010), and to 
elicit specific changes in cognition, judgment, and behaviour (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). 
A definitive conclusion on the differences between the re-experience of discrete emotions is far 
from close (Lench et al., 2011), but the relationship between emotional re-experience and 
closely related cognitive function (e.g., episodic memory and executive functions) provides 
new opportunities to identify the differences in the re-experience of discrete emotions. 
 However, the explicit influence of cognitive processes on the re-experience of discrete 
emotions has not been directly investigated for a comprehensive range of emotions. Thus, two 
questions of interest were addressed presently: (1) can all classes of discrete emotions be re-
experienced equally in the absence of episodic recall, over a sustained period of time (30 
minutes); and (2) what cognitive functions can predict the intensity of the re-experience of 
discrete basic emotions (with the most likely options being episodic recall and executive 
functions)? This is the first investigation of the differences between the experience of four 
basic discrete emotions (i.e., anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) of amnesic patients 
(Korsakoff’s syndrome) and control participants with unimpaired episodic memory. Firstly, the 
relationship between the episodic recall and the experience of each discrete emotion after 30 
minutes was assessed. Secondly, the relationship between the intensity of the emotional re-
experience of anger, fear, sadness, and happiness after 30 minutes, and executive function 
abilities was also investigated. 
 
 




Twenty Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) patients were recruited from the local health board 
in Wales (N=6), and from a residential care home in England (N=14). North Wales patients had 
been diagnosed with Korsakoff’s syndrome by the collaborating Consultant Neurologist and 
were living at home or in residential care units. England patients had been diagnosed at an 
outside clinic and were living in the residential care home from where they were recruited. The 
inclusion criteria (i.e., the clinical diagnosis and general eligibility) were assessed by the 
referring clinician from the patients’ medical notes (i.e., the collaborating Consultant 
Neurologist for the Wales patients, and the clinical staff at the residential care home for the 
England patients). These included a documented history of acute Wernicke’s encephalopathy, a 
lasting anterograde amnesia not related to progressive dementia, and no evidence of other 
neurological disease (e.g., history of hypoxia, traumatic brain injury, and any relevant 
examination or neuroimaging findings) that could account for amnesia. In four of the six 
patients from Wales, the diagnosis was also confirmed with high-resolution magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) scans showing atrophy of the mammillary bodies or lesions in the 
medial thalamus on T1-weighted images. Patients were excluded if they lacked capacity to give 
consent, had major psychiatric disorders (e.g., delirium, schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder, unipolar depressive disorder, bipolar affective disorder, etc.), severe language 
impairments (expressive/receptive/conduction or transcortical sensory/motor aphasias or 
anomia, affecting comprehension, production or repetition), or English fluency below native 
speaker level. Episodic memory and general cognitive functioning (including separate verbal 
and procedural components) were also assessed and are reported in this study. 
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Twenty neurologically normal control (NC) participants were selected from the local 
community participant panel. All patients provided written informed consent at the beginning 
of each of the four experimental sessions and continued verbal consent throughout each 
session. All participants completed all four sessions of the study in return for the usual 
participant payment (£10/hour). 
Basic demographics and neuropsychological assessment data for both groups (see Table 
1) showed that Korsakoff patients were younger, but had fewer years of education than 
controls. Their episodic memory tested via the auditory modality was significantly impaired 
(Cohen’s d >3.50), but not their working memory. The scores on the Mini-mental Scale 
Examination were also in the non-clinical range for both groups. And although the raw 
performance of the Korsakoff patients on the Trail Making Test was deficient compared to 
controls, the contrast scores were non-significant, revealing that their deficit may be explained 
by the visual and perhaps motor symptoms associated with their deficit, rather than a 
substantial cognitive decline (i.e., dementia). The patients’ scores on the adult intelligence test 
reinforced this argument, showing no difference in verbal IQ, and verbal comprehension, but 
inferior scores on performance IQ and processing speed. 
------------------------------------Insert Table 1----------------------------------------------------- 
 
Stimuli and Measures 
Four emotional vignettes were used to elicit discretely anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness respectively (i.e., at higher intensity levels than all other non-target emotions). A 
propositional analysis (Kintsch, 1994; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) was performed on all 
vignettes and each propositional unit was treated as a discrete recall unit. A detailed description 
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of the protocol was reported by Turner and Greene (1977). Each story had 60 recall units, 
whose complete recollection was used to calculate the recall accuracy. Recall was measured by 
comparing the transcripts of the audio recordings of participants’ recollections of the stories to 
the original scripts and counting the number of propositional units correctly reproduced. 
Momentary ratings of emotional experience were collected using the anger, fear, 
happiness, and sadness questionnaires from the Visual Analogue Mood Scales (VAMS; Stern, 
1997), presented in random order. The questionnaire displays a single vertical analogue scale 
per page, corresponding to one discrete emotion, and anchored at both ends by schematic faces 
and label words (i.e., Neutral, Angry, Afraid, Happy, or Sad). The neutral expression is always 
at the top of the scale, and the target emotion at the bottom. VAMS have been devised 
specifically for neurologically and cognitively impaired patients, and have been validated 
successfully (Arruda, Stern, Somerville, 1999; Nyenhuis, Yamamoto, Stern, Luchetta, & 
Arruda, 1997). VAMS produced a high test-retest reliability for each of the four scale used: 
anger (r=0.73), fear (r=0.69), sadness (r=0.49) and happiness (r=0.73); and similarly high 
content validity respectively (0.70, 0.50, 0.81, and 0.90) in validation studies by Stern, Arruda, 
Hooper, Wolfner, and Morey (1997). 
 
Design and procedure 
The experiment employed a mixed-factorial design with two groups (Korsakoff’s 
syndrome patients and control participants), and four emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and 
happiness). The presentation order of the four sets of stories was counterbalanced using a 
balanced latin-square. Participants completed the study over four separate sessions, scheduled 
exactly one week apart. Starting times for each session were aimed to be the same for each 
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participant and varied non-significantly. Each session targeted a specific basic emotion, using a 
different emotional vignette, and following a similar procedure between sessions.  
The emotion elicitation paradigm was modelled after the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test (RAVLT) – a long-established instrument for measuring episodic memory specifically 
designed for amnesic patients (see Schmidt, 1996) and used emotional narratives instead of 
word-lists presented in three (instead of five in RAVLT) successive repetitions to allow 
participants to fixate the episodic details of the emotional stories. This was aimed to allow 
Korsakoff patients to process the meaning of the story as a whole, and create associations 
between the character and context of each story and the emotion eliciting actions presented. 
Similarly with the RAVLT, the stories were read out to each participant by the same 
researcher, in a neutral tone of voice, practiced and validated in extensive initial piloting. Both 
Korsakoff’s patients and controls listened to the target vignette in three successive repetitions, 
and after each presentation recalled the story, and provided momentary ratings of the four basic 
emotions. Standardised instructions were used for the orienting task (i.e., “Please listen to the 
following story and imagine that you are personally experiencing what is happening in the 
text.”), and the same for the recall task (“Please try to reproduce out loud the previous story, 
including as many details as you can remember.”) and emotion measurement task (“Please 
indicate on the following questionnaire how angry (afraid, sad, happy) you feel right now. You 
should place a mark anywhere along the length of this vertical the line from right at the top – if 
you are not at all angry (afraid, sad, happy), to right at the bottom, if you are very angry 
(afraid, sad, happy).” 
The three presentations were followed by an Interference phase, when participants 
listened to a novel, distracting story, followed by similar recall and emotion rating tasks. 
Orienting instructions were adjusted slightly as follows: “Please listen to the following new 
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story and imagine that you are personally experiencing what is happening in the text.” 
Similarly, the instructions for the recall task were “Please try to reproduce out loud the 
previous story, including as many details as you can remember.” Instructions for the emotion 
rating task remained unchanged for this and all subsequent phases. 
Next, participants were asked to directly recall the initial target story once again, but 
notably unlike before, without a prior presentation (Immediate Recall phase) and provide 
momentary ratings of emotions. The recall instructions used were: “Please try to reproduce out 
loud the earlier story that I read to you three times at the start of the session, including as many 
details as you can remember.” Similarly with the RAVLT paradigm, the story was never 
identified by name or topic, and no further information or prompts about the target story were 
provided to participants (even if they requested them), other than that the story had been read 
three times, not immediately before, but at the start of the session. 
After a 30 minute delay interval, occupied with various pen-and-paper filler tasks, 
participants were asked again to recall the target story without prior presentation (Delayed 
Recall phase) and to provide emotion ratings for each of the four basic emotions. All 
instructions were the same as in the Immediate Recall phase. 
 
Data analysis 
 All participants completed all four sessions of the study. Recall transcripts were scored 
independently by two blind raters against the initially identified recall units to produce the 
recall accuracy score with an almost perfect inter-rater agreement (Kappa=0.93, p<.001, 95% 
CI [0.928, 0.932]). The final recall score was computed as the average of the two ratings. 
Emotional experience ratings from the visual analogue scales were converted into numeric 
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values ranging from 0-10 (using one decimal place). Mixed-factorial ANOVAs followed-up by 
planned contrasts were used to compare the intensity and recall accuracy scores of the four sets 
of emotional stories. Simple Bonferroni corrections were applied to the family-wise alpha rate 
(α=.05) for planned contrasts. Independent-samples one-way ANOVAs confirmed that there 
were no order effects for the recall accuracy scores (anger, F(3,36)=.04, p=.988., ηp
2=.004.; 
fear, F(3,36)=.04, p=.991, ηp
2=.003; sadness, F(3,36)=.15, p=.927, ηp
2=.013; happiness, 
F(3,36)=.07, p=.975, ηp
2=.006), the overall intensity of emotion ratings (anger, F(3,36)=1.32, 
p=.284, ηp
2=.099; fear, F(3,36)=2.02, p=.129, ηp
2=.144; sadness, F(3,36)=.84, p=.480, 
ηp
2=.066; happiness, F(3,36)=2.06, p=.123, ηp
2=.146), or the intensity of target emotions 
(anger, F(3,36)=.97, p=.417, ηp
2=.075; fear, F(3,36)=2.0, p=.132, ηp
2=.142; sadness, 
F(3,36)=1.02, p=.394, ηp
2=.078; happiness, F(3,36)=1.88, p=.151, ηp
2=.135). 
 Recall accuracy scores and emotion intensity ratings were analysed using mixed-
factorial ANOVAs. Moreover, emotion intensity ratings were also analysed using a MANOVA 
(where individual ratings of discrete emotions at each time point were viewed as four 
dependent variables), and the results of the mixed-factorial ANOVA were confirmed. Only the 
ANOVA results are presented below. 
Two further exploratory correlation analyses were performed for the Korsakoff patients 
group only, between the affective re-experience of the four discrete emotions after 30 minutes, 
and executive function and higher cognitive abilities. Partial correlations (controlling for recall 
accuracy) were performed separately for Korsakoff patients and control participants between 
the intensity ratings of the four basic emotions after recalling the stories after the 30 minutes 
delay and (i) five composite scores of the DKEFS Trail Making Test (see Table 1), and (ii) 
seven indices and composite scores of the WAIS. Bonferroni corrections for multiple 
comparisons were applied to all exploratory analyses, and the results are reported separately. 




The present study investigated the discrete emotional experience of four basic emotions 
(anger, fear, sadness, and happiness) for a group of 20 Korsakoff patients and 20 control 
participants, following the recollection of four emotional vignettes. Firstly, we sought to 
establish the difference in the recall accuracy between the two groups, compare the emotional 
experience for each discrete emotion after the story recall, and investigate the relationship 
between recall accuracy and emotional re-experience. Secondly, a further set of correlational 
analyses was carried out between the intensity of the target emotion and the performance on 
executive function and complex cognitive function (IQ) tests. 
 
The recall accuracy of the emotional stories 
The Korsakoff patients were expected to show a substantial level of memory 
impairment compared to controls, across all four emotions. As shown in Figure 1, the patients’ 
recall accuracy was several times lower than that of controls, at all time points. 
----------------------------------------------Insert Figure 1 ------------------------------------------------- 
An initial 2x4x6 factorial ANOVA (Group x Story x Time) of recall accuracy scores 
confirmed the substantial differences between the recall scores of Korsakoff patients and 
control participants for all four stories: anger (F(1,38)=201.49, p<.001, ηp
2=.841), fear 
(F(1,38)=145.41, p<.001, ηp
2=.793), sadness (F(1,38)=573.92, p<.001, ηp
2=.938), and 
happiness (F(1,38)=323.28, p<.001, ηp
2=.895), as well as two significant interactions between 
the participant groups across the five time points (F(4,152)=30.27, p<.001, ηp
2=.443), and 
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between the participant groups and the four emotions (F(3,114)=13.41, p<.001, ηp
2=.261). 
Thus, the difference between the recall of the two groups was substantial for all stories 
(.793≤ηp
2 ≤.938). Follow-up analyses further explored the two interactions (Group x Time and 
Group x Emotion). The two interactions can be explained together. On the one hand, as 
expected, the repetition helped improve control participants’ recall accuracy, after the second 
and third presentations (Table 2; Presentation 2 vs 1 and Presentation 3 vs 1), for all four 
emotions. Moreover, their recall accuracy remained unchanged after the interference story 
(Table 2; Immediate Recall vs Presentation 3) or after 30 minutes (Table 2; Delayed Recall vs 
Presentation 3), overall showing substantial learning of the story details (Table 2; Delayed 
Recall vs Presentation 1). 
 
------------------------------------------ Insert Table 2 ---------------------------------------- 
On the other hand, the Korsakoff patients’ recall accuracy scores showed a different 
pattern over time (explaining the Group x Time interaction) and varied between stories (Group 
x Emotion interaction). Thus, patients’ recall accuracy either did not change over time (anger 
stories), or showed minimal improvements by the third presentation only (fear, sadness, and 
happiness stories). Subsequently, the patients showed significant forgetting after the 
interference phase for the sadness and happiness stories (Table 2; Immediate Recall vs 
Presentation 3) and after 30 minutes for the fear, sadness and happiness stories (Table 2; 
Delayed Recall vs Presentation 3). Overall, the patients’ recall accuracy scores at the beginning 
and at the end of each session were unchanged, showing that over time, their episodic memory 
performance did not benefit from the repeated presentations of the stories (Table 2; Delayed 
Recall vs Presentation 1). Thus, the Korsakoff patients presented a substantial episodic 
memory impairment, and any minimal learning of some episodic details was lost for most 
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stories after the interference phase and for all after the 30 minute delay (which was the time 
point of interest in this study). These results encourage the investigation of the differences in 
the re-experience of discrete emotions, in the presence and absence of episodic information 
about the original events – especially after the 30 minute delay.  
 
The re-experience of discrete emotions 
The intensity of discrete emotions after each of the four stories showed a specific 
elicitation of the target emotion (see Figure 2). Despite the large difference in episodic recall 
between the two groups (reported above), emotional experience was surprisingly similar for 
Korsakoff patients and controls. 
------------------------------------------ Insert Figure 2 -------------------------------------------- 
An initial 2x4x4x6 factorial ANOVA (Group x Story x Emotion x Time)1 of emotion 
intensity ratings found that the largest effect was a significant Story by Emotion by Time 
interaction (F(45,1575)=28.40, p<.001, ηp
2=.448), which we explored further. There was no 
effect of Group (F(1,35)=2.39, p=.131, ηp
2=.064). The effect of Story was significant 
(F(3,35)=14.92, p<.001, ηp
2=.299), but this is unremarkable because each story targeted a 
different emotion, thus we expected a different pattern of emotion ratings, by design. The 
largest effect (Story x Emotion x Time interaction) was followed up with two separate factorial 
ANOVAs for each story, one including and one excluding the Interference time point (alpha 
level corrected for multiple comparisons, α=.006; see Table 3). This allowed us to isolate the 
effect of the Interference phase, which included a story of an opposite valence to the other time 
points, and thus, was expected to elicit a different emotional experience. Firstly, a 2x4x6 
                                                          
1 Results were also confirmed by a 2x4x6 MANOVA (Group x Story x Time). 
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factorial ANOVA (Group x Emotion x Time) included the Interference phase confirmed that 
the previous overall interaction between Emotion and Time remained significant for each story 
in part. This showed that emotions intensity ratings changed over time – as was expected due to 
the Interference story. However, when the second 2x4x5 factorial ANOVA (Group x Emotion 
x Time) analysed the emotion ratings excluding the Interference phase, the interaction between 
Emotion and Time was no longer significant for any story, with only a main effect of Emotion 
remaining each time. Thus, the experience of emotions remained unchanged over time, from 
the first presentation until the last recall after 30 minutes, for both Korsakoff patients and 
controls (see Table 3).  
------------------------------------- Insert Table 3 -------------------------------------------------- 
Finally, the main effect of Emotion was explained using planned simple contrasts 
between the target emotion and each of the non-target emotions for all stories (see Table 4). 
The intensity of the target emotion was highest for each story, for both participant groups – 
suggesting a discrete elicitation of the target emotion both when the episodic memory was 
severely impaired (Korsakoff patients) and when memory performance was intact (Control 
participants). 
----------------------------------------- Insert Table 4 ---------------------------------------------- 
 
The relationship between recall accuracy and emotion intensity 
As shown above, despite the sizable difference in episodic recall, both groups of 
participants experienced the target emotion of each story at significantly higher levels than any 
of the non-target emotions. This would predict a null relationship between the intensity of the 
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target emotion and the information remembered from each story after the 30 minutes delay (see 
Figure 3). 
------------------------------------------------ Insert Figure 3 ----------------------------------------------  
 
Pearson correlations failed to reach significance for the stories eliciting negative 
emotions (anger, fear, and sadness). The Korsakoff patients’ data showed an initially positive 
relationship between the intensity ratings and recall accuracy scores of the happiness story. 
Three outliers were identified in the dataset, and when removed, the correlation failed to reach 
significance (r(16)=0.55, p=.029, α=.025). It should be noted that the Pearson correlation test is 
underpowered at this relatively low sample size. However, even when Korsakoff patients’ and 
control participants’ data are combined (on account of the similar emotion experience ratings 
between the two groups), the correlations remain distinctly non-significant. Composite scores 
of emotion intensity ratings and recall accuracy across all stories are similarly uncorrelated for 
either group of participants. Interestingly, patients whose recall accuracy was almost nil (4-5%) 
reported a wide range of intensity ratings (0-90%) for all target emotions. The null correlations 
between emotional intensity and recall accuracy seemed to be explained by equal spread in 
emotion intensity scores for participants with considerably different recall scores. Specifically, 
some of amnesic patients with low levels of recall accuracy scores reported moderate-to-high 
levels of the target emotions for all classes of emotions (e.g., anger, 7.2; fear, 9.9; sadness, 6.5; 
happiness, 4.7). The results suggest that the amount of episodic information retained and 
actively recalled seems not to be related to the intensity of basic emotions re-experience, 
regardless of whether episodic memory is impaired or not. 
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The relationship between emotion re-experience and executive function 
Korsakoff patients’ performance on the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
(DKEFS) Trail Making Test was normal – and similar to controls’ – when their ocular 
movement impairment (nystagmus – a common sign of their condition; Victor, Adams, & 
Collins, 1989) was taken into account (see contrast scores 1-4). The Trail Making Test was the 
only measure with a sufficient sample size in this study to allow the investigation of the 
relationship between the intensity of the re-experience of the four basic emotions after the 30 
minutes delay and executive function, in the two groups of participants. 
  Control participants showed a strong negative relationship between the re-experience of 
anger after delayed recall and the Contrast Score 1 of the DKEFS Trail Making Test (Number 
Letter Switching accounting for Visual Scanning performance). This relationship was 
moderately negative for the re-experience of fear (see Table 5), and nonsignificant (but 
continuing to show a negative trend) for sadness and happiness2.  
------------------------------------------------- Insert Table 5 ----------------------------------------------- 
The results show that when controlling for episodic memory differences, greater 
cognitive flexibility and inhibition ability are associated with a dampened re-experience of 
emotions after 30 minutes (e.g., the high arousal emotions of anger and fear). Korsakoff 
patients failed to show a similar relationship between the executive function measure and the 
re-experience of discrete emotions. This is remarkable in the context of earlier findings that 
Korsakoff patients re-experienced all basic emotions at similar levels with control participants 
after 30 minutes, and scored similarly on the contrast measures of executive function. The only 
                                                          
2 When Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons are applied to the significance level only the anger 
correlations reached significance. Correlation analyses are notably underpowered at these sample sizes. 
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notable difference between the two groups is their episodic memory performance. Thus, when 
episodic memory is impaired, executive function, even when preserved at normal levels, seems 
to play a negligible role in reducing the emotion re-experience over time. 
 
The re-experience of discrete emotions and general intellectual abilities 
 Finally, the relationship between the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) and the 
intensity of the re-experience of the four basic emotions after 30 minutes delay was analysed, 
controlling for recall accuracy. The sample of available data was too low to perform two 
separate partial correlation analyses (for Korsakoff patients and controls), and a second 
covariate (Group) was added to account for the differences between participants3.   
------------------------------------------------ Insert Table 6 ------------------------------------------------ 
 
 Only Processing Speed Index showed a strong positive correlation with the intensity of 
fear and happiness, and a moderately positive correlation with the intensity of sadness4. This 
measure of cognitive performance assesses focusing attention, and requires persistence and 
planning abilities. Thus, it would seem surprising that processing speed should show a positive 
correlation with emotional re-experience, opposite to the previous findings about the negative 
correlation between emotion re-experience and the executive function of cognitive flexibility, 
inhibition, and task switching. Although Korsakoff patients contributed most of the data for 
                                                          
3 The order of covariates in each analysis was: Group and then Recall Accuracy. 
4 Fear and happiness correlations remain significant when correcting the α level for multiple comparisons, but all 
correlations are substantially underpowered at this sample size. 
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 This study focused on the relationship between re-experience and episodic recall, and 
also executive function, in a group of Korsakoff syndrome patients and neurologically normal 
controls. As expected, the Korsakoff patients recalled significantly less (between 70% and 80% 
less) episodic material from each of the four stories than did controls. In addition, despite the 
substantial difference in recall, the experience of each discrete emotion was not significantly 
different between the two groups of participants. Korsakoff patients, especially those who 
recalled almost nothing (0-5%) from the original story, reported wide-ranging levels of 
emotional experience (0-90%), similarly with control participants, whose episodic memory was 
unimpaired. This represents expanded evidence for the independence of emotional memory 
from episodic memory systems (see Haman, 2001; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Phelps, 2006). 
Finally, certain executive functions (e.g., cognitive flexibility and response inhibition) were 
significantly and negatively related to the intensity of discrete emotions (e.g., anger and fear). 
This represents novel evidence for the relationship between the magnitude of emotional re-
experience and specific executive functions of cognitive flexibility and response inhibition. 
The independence of emotional from episodic memory has been supported by reports of 
amnesic patients able to reliably re-experience past emotions, without the ability to episodically 
recall the triggering events, but only for simple emotional dyads (Chapelle, Philippot, & van 
der Linden, 2007; Feinstein, et al., 2010; Guzman-Velez, Feinstein, & Tranel, 2014). The 
present study reported this phenomenon for fine-grained individual basic emotions (anger, 
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fear, sadness, and happiness), and not just for generic positive or negative affect. This finding 
has important theoretical implications. The encoding and retrieval of emotional stimuli has 
long been associated with an extended network of brain regions, strongly interconnected with 
the amygdala, including the thalamus (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), and certain cortical areas: the 
insular, anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices (LeDoux, 1993; Maratos, & Rugg, 2001; 
Smith, Henson, Dolan, & Rugg, 2004). However, neurological studies investigating the 
dissociation between emotional and other memory mechanisms have been limited to showing 
either (1) a preserved generic ability of amnesic patients to re-experience arousing emotional 
stimuli – neuroanatomically associated with the amygdala (Adolphs, Cahill, Schul, & 
Babinsky, 1997; Hamman, 2001; Zald, 2003), or (2) their ability to re-experience separate 
positive and negative emotions – argued to originate in phylogenetically older structures of the 
brain, in particular, the periaqueductal grey (Panksepp, 2009). The present study found that this 
effect was maintained independently for discrete emotions, usually involving more complex 
brain systems (Vytal & Hamman, 2010). The specificity of emotional memory shown presently 
invites further enquiry into the neural pathways that support such complex affective processes 
independently of episodic memory systems. 
Furthermore, we reported that amnesic patients have the ability to re-experience each 
discrete emotion at levels similar to controls, failing to support previous suggestions (Feinstein, 
et al., 2010; Guzman-Velez et al., 2014) that, perhaps, certain classes of emotions (e.g., 
sadness) could show an increased re-experience in the case of amnesic patients than controls. 
This is particularly notable since the present investigation benefits from two superior 
experimental characteristics (resolution and power), because (1) separate classes of negative 
affect were investigated (i.e., anger, fear and sadness) in (2) a larger sample of patients and 
controls. Importantly, while the previous two studies investigated different amnesic pathologies 
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(hippocampal amnesia; Feinstein et al.) and probable Alzheimer’s Dementia (Guzman-Vellez 
et al.), their patients presented a similar range of episodic memory performance to the 
Korsakoff syndrome patients in the present study. One possible explanation for the particularly 
stable re-experience in our study relates to the preserved executive function ability of the 
amnesic patients. We showed that high cognitive flexibility and inhibition are potentially 
related to a dampened re-experience, especially of negative emotions, and it is precisely these 
abilities that seem to be lost early in Alzheimer’s disease (Amieva, Phillips, Della Sala, & 
Henry, 2004). Comparable executive function data is lacking from the previous reports. Thus, 
following from the present findings, it is recommended that future investigations (1) adopt a 
larger set of discrete emotions (especially on the negative side) to be investigated 
concomitantly for amnesic patients, and (2) evaluate executive function abilities at the same 
time as emotional re-experience, as the relationship between the two may explain differences in 
affective and cognitive performance. 
 The present data on multiple discrete emotions are also relevant when considering the 
relationship between emotional re-experience and executive function, reported for the first time 
in this study. The results showed negative correlations between measures of cognitive 
flexibility and response inhibition and the intensity of the re-experience of discrete emotions 
(e.g., anger and fear). This implies that independent emotional memory systems may be 
closely linked with abilities traditionally ascribed to the prefrontal cortices, in ways that are not 
been specifically explained in the literature so far. Our findings are broadly consistent with 
previous reports that performance on the Trail Making Test, and the Stroop Test correlated 
with the ability to down-regulate negative emotions, and up-regulate positive emotions 
(Gyurak et al., 2012). Revealing the mechanisms that support this relationship between 
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executive control and specific affective re-experience, in particular in the absence of episodic 
memory, remains a presently unexplored and potentially fecund area of study. 
 A first key question regarding the current findings refers to the quality, as opposed to 
the quantity, of amnesic patients’ episodic recall, particularly in relation to gist memory. The 
number of episodic details reproduced by the Korsakoff patients was substantially reduced by 
comparison with controls, but the question remains whether the amnesic patients managed to 
remember the key emotional events of the stories, which may have had some contributions to 
the gist, without the details surrounding these events. Several authors have suggested that the 
gist of a memory seems to be encoded in a distinct schema from other episodic details (Rubin, 
Stoltzfus, & Wall, 1991), and neurological studies have reported that gist-based conceptual 
processing can be preserved in amnesic patients (Deason, Hussey, Budson, & Ally, 2012). For 
example, amnesic patients typically hold meaningful conversations and make relevant remarks 
regarding events beyond the extent of their episodic and working memory stores (Gooding, 
Isaac, & Mayes, 2005; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009). Amnesic 
patients’ gist memory performance was also shown to be similar to that of healthy controls 
(Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; Nissan, Abrahams, & Della Sala, 2013). We propose that the 
mechanism that enables gist information to be retained might be based, at least in part, on 
emotional memory processes (Adolphs, Tranel, & Buchanan, 2005; Wessel & Merckelbach, 
1998). Therefore, in the context of the present findings, despite the substantially impaired 
episodic recall of the Korsakoff patients, it could be argued that the emotional gist of stories 
has been retained by patients. As the encoding of the gist of memories may rely at least in part 
on neural structures central to affective experience, such as the amygdalae (Adolphs, Denburg, 
& Tranel, 2001; Adolphs, Tranel, Buchanan, 2005; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006), gist information 
may be in part derived from emotional memory. Consistent with this idea we found that even 
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patients who failed to recall anything at all from the stories (i.e., whose recall accuracy was 
indeed nil), reported moderate-to-high levels of the target discrete emotions. Conversely, the 
remaining patients who recalled little of the stories and re-experienced little of the target 
emotion did so throughout the study from the first presentation to the delayed recall phase, and 
it could be argued that they either failed to encode even the gist of the stories, or failed to 
respond to the emotion elicitation paradigm. However, any influence of gist memory on the 
specific experience of discrete emotions of amnesic patients remains an empirical question 
beyond the scope of the current study. The present data did not allow the examination of this 
hypothesis, but minor design and stimuli alterations could potentially allow it.  
 A second question can be asked about the possible role of procedural memory in the 
remarkable stability of all discrete emotions of Korsakoff patients, especially between the 
presentation and recall phases. Indeed, patients listened to the same story three times in 
succession, and provided ratings of their emotions each time, using similar pen-and-paper 
visual analogue scales. Therefore, when prompted to recall the story without another 
presentation (in the Immediate Recall and 30 minutes Delayed Recall phases), the Korsakoff 
patients may not have accessed either their episodic memory (as expected), or emotional 
memory systems (as concluded previously), but instead may have remembered the procedural 
details of the emotion rating task, and may have simply filled in the questionnaire as they had 
practiced three times earlier. One key methodological aspect of the emotion measurement task, 
and one piece of empirical evidence from the patients’ own data make procedural memory and 
unlikely confound. Firstly, the during the emotion rating task patients provided measurements 
of each emotion on a separate page of the questionnaire, and the four pages were presented in 
random order. Thus, in producing similar emotion ratings over time, patients actively and 
correctly selected the target emotion, each time, while disregarding all 3 non-target emotions (a 
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distinctly cognitive task). Secondly, the amnesic patients showed a dramatic and accurate 
response to the interference story (which had an opposite valence to the target story). Their 
emotion ratings changed consistently and unequivocally away from the target story, in favour 
of the opposite emotional valence of the interference story. Subsequently, during the 
Immediate and Delayed recall phases amnesic patients switched back to the exact original 
target emotion, ignoring all three other emotions. This level of flexibility cannot be explained 
by procedural processes, because it was not rehearsed. Thus, the target emotion must have held 
a special value for patients when they attempted to recall the related story, and this value was 
markedly different from all other emotions – effect which was observed similarly for control 
participants. 
 The association between emotional memory and executive functions identified in this 
study is particularly relevant for patient care and psychotherapy. Episodically amnesic patients 
(including many Korsakoff syndrome and Alzheimers’ patients) often show a selective 
memory deficit, but adequate levels of executive function (Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006; 
Press, Amaral, & Squire, 1989). In light of the present study, these patients are likely to retain 
the capacity to re-experience a full range of discrete basic emotions, including on the negative 
side (anger, fear, sadness), leading to two important implications for their care and 
management. Firstly, despite their episodic memory impairment, amnesic patients’ sustained 
emotional acuity, means their social environment can have a lasting impact on their emotional 
wellbeing. Thus, professional support is required particularly in stressful periods of their care 
pathway. Families and friends, often the first to discover the patients’ deficit, can also play a 
role in limiting the usually negative emotional experience associated with the patients’ 
realisation of their neurological deficit, and their need for long term care. Secondly, therapeutic 
interventions should address not only the obvious episodic memory deficit, but also the often 
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substantial emotional burden associated with amnesia (Tarrier, Barrowclough, Ward, 
Donaldson, Burns, Gregg, 2002). We showed that amnesic patients who have sufficient levels 
of executive functions (especially cognitive inhibition and flexibility) remain particularly 
vulnerable to the effect of negative emotions, and previous work has already shown that 
emotion regulation strategies are effective for this patient group (Beer, Lombardo, & Gross, 
2007). Important emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraisal (i.e., changing the way that 
one thinks about a situation, to perceive an event in less negative or more positive terms), are 
known to be reliant on cognitive inhibition (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012; Salas, 
Gross, & Turnbull, 2014). Moreover, even neurological patients with impaired flexibility and 
inhibition can reappraise when prompted (Salas, Gross, Rafal, Viñas-Guasch & Turnbull, 
2013). Thus, amnesic patients who show intact emotional memory and executive function are 
good candidates for emotion-regulation interventions, and are likely to show the highest 
therapeutic gain. Those patients with unimpaired emotional memory, but poor executive 
function can potentially experience powerful but poorly regulated emotions, and are likely to 
require more intensive emotional support. Notably, the present study did not investigate 
whether these patients were capable of generating re-appraisal strategies, and this remains an 
interesting direction for future research. 
 Patients who have profound episodic memory impairment tend to learn on the basis of 
emotional experience, and this is unrelated to the magnitude of the episodic memory ability. It 
is not completely clear what other factors are driving this process, but we have some hints that 
executive function and processing speed might be important. However, opportunities to 
understand the detail and extent of emotional memory have not been pursued and explored 
fully. There are obvious implications for extensions of the present study, for example in the 
management of dementia, or in understanding how emotional memory underpins the 
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Table 1. Basic demographics and neuropsychological assessment data of Korsakoff syndrome 













  N M (SD)  N M (SD) p p (d) 
Basic demographics         
Age (years)  20 53.5 (7.8)   64.0 (7.8)  <.001 (1.34) 
Education (years)  20 11.0 (0.3)   13.1 (0.7)  .008 (0.88) 
Gender (men/women)  20 14 / 6   10 / 10 .197 - 
         
Wechsler Memory Scale III-R 






Auditory Immediate  20 69.2 (10.8)  16 118.8 (15.2)  <.001 (3.76) 
Auditory Delayed  20 66.6 (10.8)  16 121.5 (12.5)  <.001 (4.70) 
Auditory Recognition Delayed  19 71.1 (11.9)  5 107.0 (20.8)  .015 (2.12) 
Working Memory  14 90.3 (14.7)  5 99.4 (14.3)  .247 
         
Mini Mental State Examination  20 24.6 (3.8)  20 29.9 (0.5)  <.001 (1.97) 
         
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 






Trail Making Test (TMT)         
TMT Condition 1 – Visual Scanning  19 5.9 (3.0)  19 9.7 (3.9)  .002 (1.06) 
TMT Condition 2 – Number Sequencing  19 6.6 (4.2)  19 10.4 (2.7)  .002 (1.07) 
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TMT Condition 3 – Letter Sequencing  19 6.9 (4.3)  19 11.6 (1.9)  <.001 (1.43) 
TMT Condition 4 – Number-Letter 
Sequencing 
 
19 6.4 (3.9) 
 
19 11.3 (1.8) 
 <.001 (1.62) 
TMT Condition 5 – Motor Speed  19 7.9 (3.8)  19 9.8 (2.2)  .078 
TMT Contrast 1 – Number-Letter 
Switching vs. Visual Scanning 
 
19 10.5 (3.7) 
 
19 11.4 (3.2) 
 .406 
TMT Contrast 2 – Number-Letter 
Switching vs. Number Sequencing 
 
19 9.9 (4.4) 
 
19 10.9 (2.4) 
 .419 
TMT Contrast 3 – Number-Letter 
Switching vs. Letter Sequencing 
 
19 9.5 (3.7) 
 
19 9.6 (2.2) 
 .916 
TMT Contrast 4 – Number-Letter 
Switching vs. Number and Letter 
Sequencing 
 
19 9.7 (4.1) 
 
19 9.8 (2.0) 
 .961 
TMT Contrast 5 – Number-Letter 
Switching vs. Motor Speed 
 
19 8.5 (4.6) 
 
19 13.8 (4.3) 
 .001 (1.18) 
 






DFT Condition 1 – Filled Dots Only – 
Total Correct 
 
14 7.4 (1.9) 
 
5 9.4 (3.4) 
 .111 
DFT Condition 2 – Empty Dots Only – 
Total Correct 
 
14 7.1 (2.5) 
 
5 9.0 (3.7) 
 .210 
DFT Condition 3 – Filled-to-Empty Dots 
Switching – Total Correct 
 
14 7.8 (2.9) 
 
5 11.8 (2.9) 
 .018 (1.36) 
DFT – Design Fluency Total Correct  14 5.4 (2.6)  5 8.6 (4.2)  .059 
DFT – Combined Filled Dots and Empty 
Dots Total Correct 
 
14 7.4 (1.8) 
 
5 9.6 (3.0) 
 .066 
DFT Contrast – Switching vs Combined 
Filled Dots and Empty Dots 
 
14 4.5 (1.6) 
 
5 4.2 (3.0) 
 .777 
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Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 






Verbal IQ  13 84.0 (19.1)  4 97.0 (5.6)  .209 
Performance IQ  13 74.5 (16.3)  4 107.3 (18.0)  .004 (1.90) 
Full Scale IQ  13 80.8 (11.9)  4 101.5 (10.8)  .007 (1.82) 
Verbal Comprehension Index  13 85.3 (24.7)  4 98.0 (7.9)  .336 
Perceptual Organisation Index  13 77.2 (22.4)  4 105.0 (13.6)  .035 (1.50) 
Working Memory Index  13 80.7 (20.7)  4 102.8 (4.6)  .056 
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Table 2. Follow-up analyses of recall accuracy scores show Korsakoff patients were unable to 
learn the stories over time, and reproduced as few details of the stories after 30 minutes as they 
did after the first presentation. Control participants learned the stories over the three 
presentations and could reproduce them with peak accuracy after 30 minutes. (Alpha level 






Story Analysis Contrast F p η p
2 F p η p
2
Presentation 2 vs 1 5.41 .031 .222 91.87 <.001* .829
Presentation 3 vs 1 3.84 .065 .168 76.59 <.001* .801
Immediate Recall vs Presentation 3 .09 .774 .004 .07 .798 .004
Delayed Recall vs Presentation 3 2.74 .115 .123 <.01 .970 <.001
Overall Delayed Recall vs Presentation 1 <.01 .981 <.001 76.59 <.001* .787
Presentation 2 vs 1 4.80 .041 .201 51.61 <.001* .731
Presentation 3 vs 1 14.92 .001* .440 75.21 <.001* .798
Immediate Recall vs Presentation 3 4.44 .049 .189 1.17 .292 .058
Delayed Recall vs Presentation 3 14.86 .001* .439 2.85 .108 .130
Overall Delayed Recall vs Presentation 1 .44 .514 .023 46.87 <.001* .712
Presentation 2 vs 1 3.00 .100 .136 65.00 <.001* .774
Presentation 3 vs 1 6.87 .017* .266 80.91 <.001* .810
Immediate Recall vs Presentation 3 6.85 .017* .265 1.18 .292 .058
Delayed Recall vs Presentation 3 9.83 .005* .341 3.34 .083 .150
Overall Delayed Recall vs Presentation 1 .38 .545 .020 46.21 <.001* .709
Presentation 2 vs 1 .94 .344 .047 55.14 <.001* .744
Presentation 3 vs 1 8.02 .011* .297 74.93 <.001* .798
Immediate Recall vs Presentation 3 8.13 .010* .300 1.31 .267 .064
Delayed Recall vs Presentation 3 11.95 .003* .386 0.28 .604 .014















The re-experience of discrete emotions in amnesia  38 
 
Table 3. The intensity of emotions varied over time, only due to the Interference phase, when 
an oppositely valenced story was presented. Conversely, when only the target stories were 
presented or recalled, emotion experience remained unchanged for both groups (P1-






Story Stories Time points F p η p 2
Target & Interference P1  P2  P3  Int   IR  DR 24.06 <.001* .388
Target story only P1  P2  P3          IR  DR 1.33 .256 .034
Target & Interference P1  P2  P3  Int   IR  DR 38.54 <.001* .517
Target story only P1  P2  P3          IR  DR 1.50 .120 .040
Target & Interference P1  P2  P3  Int   IR  DR 22.25 <.001* .369
Target story only P1  P2  P3          IR  DR 2.40 .130 .059
Target & Interference P1  P2  P3  Int   IR  DR 29.27 <.001* .448
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Table 4. The main effect of Emotion for each story shows the discrete elicitation of the target 
emotion over time, after both the presentation and recall of stories, for both groups (P1-








Story Time points Contrast F p η p 2
Anger v Fear 29.60 <.001* .438
Anger v Sadness 10.26 .003* .213
Anger v Sadness 25.97 <.001* .406
Fear v Anger 25.90 <.001* .418
Fear v Sadness 4.52 .040* .112
Fear v Happiness 80.08 <.001* .690
Sadness v Anger 42.51 <.001* .528
Sadness v Fear 34.63 <.001* .477
Sadness v Happiness 15.44 <.001* .289
Happiness v Anger 149.03 <.001* .805
Happiness v Fear 132.76 <.001* .787




P1  P2  P3          IR  DR
P1  P2  P3          IR  DR
P1  P2  P3          IR  DR
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Table 5. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions after 30 minutes and 
measures of executive function are reported as partial correlations controlling for recall 







r p df r p df
TMT Contrast score 1 0.22 .388 16 -0.80 <.001* 16
TMT Contrast score 2 0.11 .666 16 -0.08 .756 16
TMT Contrast score 3 0.25 .310 16 -0.59 .009* 16
TMT Contrast score 4 0.21 .411 16 -0.41 .090 16
TMT Contrast score 1 -0.24 .329 16 -0.52 .028* 16
TMT Contrast score 2 -0.22 .392 16 0.05 .838 16
TMT Contrast score 3 -0.36 .143 16 -0.35 .156 16
TMT Contrast score 4 -0.29 .241 16 -0.16 .520 16
TMT Contrast score 1 0.17 .506 16 -0.36 .146 16
TMT Contrast score 2 0.07 .784 16 0.05 .837 16
TMT Contrast score 3 0.35 .150 16 -0.31 .209 16
TMT Contrast score 4 0.20 .417 16 -0.19 .442 16
TMT Contrast score 1 0.11 .661 15 -0.36 .137 16
TMT Contrast score 2 0.21 .415 15 -0.12 .640 16
TMT Contrast score 3 0.19 .472 15 -0.04 .864 16
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Table 6. The relationship between the intensity of discrete emotions after 30 minutes and the 
index scores of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale are reported as partial correlations 






Story WAIS Index Score r p df
Verbal IQ 0.00 .998 13
Performance IQ 0.27 .324 13
Full Scale IQ -0.01 .986 13
Verbal Comprehension -0.03 .904 13
Perceptual Organisation 0.25 .377 13
Working Memory 0.28 .308 13
Processing Speed 0.41 .125 13
Verbal IQ 0.26 .353 13
Performance IQ 0.29 .294 13
Full Scale IQ 0.07 .794 13
Verbal Comprehension 0.22 .439 13
Perceptual Organisation 0.20 .479 13
Working Memory 0.50 .057 13
Processing Speed 0.84 <.001* 13
Verbal IQ 0.17 .535 13
Performance IQ 0.46 .082 13
Full Scale IQ 0.24 .398 13
Verbal Comprehension 0.16 .574 13
Perceptual Organisation 0.43 .108 13
Working Memory 0.32 .248 13
Processing Speed 0.59 .022* 13
Verbal IQ 0.14 .629 12
Performance IQ 0.34 .237 12
Full Scale IQ 0.20 .485 12
Verbal Comprehension 0.10 .731 12
Perceptual Organisation 0.16 .593 12
Working Memory 0.18 .539 12











Figure 1. Episodic recall of emotion stories for Korsakoff patients and controls. Korsakoff 
patients recalled substantially fewer story details compared to healthy controls. Error bars show 
+/– 1 SE. (P.1=Presentation 1; P.2=Presentation 2; P.3=Presentation 3; Delayed Recall = recall 










































































































D. Recall accuracy for happiness stories




Figure 2. Ratings of discrete emotions for Korsakoff patients and control participants, for the 






















































































































































































































































A1. Emotion ratings of Korsakoff patients for the anger story A2. Emotion ratings of control participants for the anger story
B1. Emotion ratings of Korsakoff patients for the fear story B2. Emotion ratings of control participants for the fear story
C1. Emotion ratings of Korsakoff patients for the sadness story C2. Emotion ratings of control participants for the sadness story
D1. Emotion ratings of Korsakoff patients for the happiness story D2. Emotion ratings of control participants for the happiness story
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patients showed a similar emotional experience to healthy controls. Both participant groups 
demonstrated a significant interaction during the Interference phase, when an oppositely 
valenced story was read and recalled. Error bars show +/– 1 SE. (Figure legend: Tg. Em. = 
Target Emotion; x-axis:  P.1=Presentation 1; P.2=Presentation 2; P.3=Presentation 3; Delayed 
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Figure 3. The correlations between the recall accuracy and the ratings of each of the four 
discrete emotions were not significant for either Korsakoff patients (A1-D1) or control 
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happiness story for Korsakoff patients was no longer significant when the 3 outlier data are 
removed from analysis. 
